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DRAINAGE, DRILLING
UNITS & CONSERVATION
AGENCY ORDERS

REFLECTION ON SUNBELT EXPLORATION
CO. V. STEPHENS PRODUCTION CO.

Phillip E. Norvell

DRAINAGE, DRILLING UNITS AND CONSERVATION
AGENCY ORDERS: SUNBELT EXPLORATION CO.
V. STEPHENS PRODUCTION CO.
by

Professor Phillip E Norvell1
I. Sunbelt Exploration Co. v. Stephens Production Co., 896 S.W 2d 867 (Ark. 1995)
In the 1950's, Stephens Production Co. and Chevron USA, Inc. (hereinafter collectively
referred to as Stephens) acquired oil and gas leases to land in the Arkoma Basin. The leases were
subsequently pooled by the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission to create the Gregory Unit. The
Gregory Unit adjoins the Blakely Unit, the Gooch No. 1 Unit, and the Gooch No. 2 Unit.
Various natural gas reservoirs, including the Dunn reservoir, lie under these units. The
established field rules of the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission permit each 640 acre unit only
one well for the Dunn reservoir. In addition to owning leases in the Gregory Unit, Stephens also
owns all the leasehold working interest in the Blakely and Gooch Units. In 1959, Stephens
established production on the Gregory Unit by completing the Gregory No. I well. That well did
not produce from the Dunn reservoir.
In 1961, Stephens completed a well on the Blakely Unit that was the first well in the
immediate area to produce from the Dunn reservoir. In 1971, Stephens recompleted the Gregory
No. 1 well to produce the Dunn reservoir from the Gregory Unit. The Dunn reservoir underlying
the Gregory Unit is “fault separated,” the reservoir is physically divided by a fault. Consequently,
the Gregory No. 1 well did not drain that part of the Dunn reservoir of the Gregory Unit that is
located on the south side of the fault. Stephens did not then know that the Dunn reservoir under
the Gregory Unit was fault separated. Between 1961 and 1985, Stephens completed offset wells
on the Gooch Units that produced gas from that part of the Dunn reservoir situated to the south
of the Gregory Unit fault.
In the late 1980’s, Sunbelt Exploration Co., (Sunbelt), acquired “top leases” from all of
the Gregory Unit lessors. In 1990, Sunbelt then demanded that Stephens release the nonproductive portion o f the Gregory Unit. Stephens, whose geologist had by then discovered the
existence of the fault, refused to release its leases and began drilling the Gregory No. 2 well that
conclusively confirmed that the Gregory Unit was fault separated. Subsequently, Stephens drilled
the Gregory No. 3 and 4 wells to produce that part of the Dunn reservoir located on the south
side of the fault.
Sunbelt, along with its lessors, sued Stephens in Circuit Court to “try title” to the
Gregory Unit leases, eject Stephens as a trespasser, and for damages and cancellation of the leases
for breach of the implied covenant to develop and protect against drainage. Also, Sunbelt sought
1 Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law (Fayetteville).
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a judicial declaration that its top leases were valid and effective from the date of their execution
and that Stephens' leases were, at that time, “ineffective.” The Circuit Court, upon Motion by
Stephens, determined that Sunbelt’s cause of action was for cancellation of Stephens’ oil and gas
leases, as opposed to “trying title,” and transferred the suit to Chancery Court. At trial, the
Chancellor entered judgment on the merits for Stephens, and also, awarded Stephens attorneys’
fees.
The Arkansas Supreme affirmed the Chancellor’s Decree on appeal. The Circuit Court
properly transferred the action to the Chancery Court. Cancellation of an oil and gas lease is an
equitable remedy and is the appropriate remedy for breach of the implied covenant of reasonable
development. Although Sunbelt mentioned ejectment in its pleadings, Sunbelt’s request for
cancellation of Stephens’ leases is appropriate and controlling and the cause of action is equitable.
Likewise, Sunbelt’s top leases only become possessory when Stephens either concedes
abandonment and voluntarily relinquishes possession of the leases or they are judicially canceled.
Absent the existence of fault separation in a unit, the Oil and Gas Commission only allows
one well per unit for the Dunn reservoir which precludes the implied obligation to drill an
additional well to the Dunn reservoir. However, Stephens did not breach its duty to discover the
Dunn fault in the Gregory Unit prior to 1990. The fault’s existence was only conclusively
demonstrated by the drilling of the Gregory No. 2 well in 1990. Prior to that time, other
geologists, including Sunbelt's geologist, also missed the fault when mapping the Unit. Moreover,
over the years the shut-in pressures for the Blakely well, the Gregory No. 1 and the Gooch wells
were almost identical, indicating that they were all producing from the same reservoir.
Nor did Stephens breach the implied covenant to protect against drainage. First, unlike
some other jurisdictions, Arkansas law does not shift the burden of proof on the issue of drainage
to the lessee when the lessee owns the wells that are allegedly draining the lease premises. More
importantly, the evidence indicates that Stephens has produced or will produce more gas from the
Gregory Unit than was originally in place under the Gregory Unit.2
II. The Background of Sunbelt
A. The Oil and Gas Lessee's Liability for Breach of the Implied Obligation to Protect
Against Drainage.
1. The Prudent Operator Standard
The lessee has an implied obligation to drill an offset well to protect against drainage when
2 The Court further held that the Chancellor did not err in awarding attorneys’ fees to
Stephens pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1991), wh ich permits the trial court to
award attorneys’ fees in breach of contract actions.
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“substantial drainage" is occurring and the offset protection well, if drilled, would likely produce
oil or gas in “paying quantities.” Production in paying quantities for purposes of the implied
drainage covenant demands that the cost of drilling, completing and operating the offset
protection well, as well as a reasonable profit for the lessee, will likely be recovered. Gerson v .
Anderson Prichard Co., 149 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1945) (applying Oklahoma law.); Blair v. Clear
Creek Oil & Gas Co.. 230 S.W. 286 (Ark. 1921).3 Damages for breach of the offset protection
covenant is the “lost royalty,” the royalty on the oil and gas unlawfully drained from the land.4
Cancellation of the lease or cancellation on condition that the lessee fails to drill an offset
protection well may also be an appropriate remedy for breach of the drainage obligation.5
2. The Common Lessee and Fraudulent Drainage
Some courts hold that the production in paying quantities standard of the prudent operator
rule does not apply to drainage occasioned by the lessee's operations on adjacent lands.
Therefore, the lessor does not have to prove that the offset protection well if drilled would likely
be profitable. The lessor must only prove that substantial drainage is occurring. This is contrary
to the maxim that a prudent operator only drills wells when it is profitable. However, it is best
explained by the famous passage from Geary v. Adams Oil & Gas Co., 31 F. Supp. 830, 834
(E.D. Ill. 1949):
“But here the mind is haunted by the fact that the defendant is the beneficiary of
the oil drained from the plaintiffs' land by the wells on the north and south which
belong to the defendant. It has not only been saved the cost of drilling, equipping
and operating a protecting well but it gets the oil anyway without plaintiffs being
paid for it.”6

3 For a citation to other cases, see Daniel F. Sullivan, Annotation, Implied Duty of Oil
and Gas Lessee to Protect against Drainage, 18 A,L.R.4th § 5 (1981).
4 230 S.W. at 289.
5 Sullivan, supra N. 3 at § 35.
6 Professor Maurice H. Merrill, another colossal oil and gas scholar of the past, also
made an equally worthy comment about fraudulent drainage:
“... no doubt if the lessee owns the fee, or royalty interest, in the adjoining land
and operates thereon to draw oil or gas from beneath the leased premises because
he will get a larger share, at the same time blocking development on part of others
by keeping the lease alive, there is both harsh dealing and sharp practice properly
deserving to be called by the hard name of fraud. Similar comment may be made if
his purpose is to favor one lessor at the expense of another.” Maurice H. Merrill,
Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases, § 111 (2nd ed. 1940).
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The rationale behind the fraudulent drainage rule has long been discredited. Omitting the
paying quantities standard in the common lessee drainage situation may subject the lessee for
liability for failure to drill an unprofitable well. The mineral owner, in the absence of having the
lands leased, would not be expected to drill an unprofitable well to avoid off tract drainage
occasioned by the rule of capture. Therefore, why should such a burden be placed on the lessee
merely because he owns the offsetting producing lease?7
Even though the possibility of unfair dealing does not merit changing the profitability
standard, inherent in the prudent operator standard. Williams et al. argue that the lessee should
bear the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of persuasion on the issue of
profitability when his adjacent operations or leasehold interests are the source of the drainage
claim.8 Some courts have followed this view. Seacat v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 561 F. Supp. 98
(D. Kan. 1983); Elliott v. Pure Oil Co.. 139 N.E. 295 (I11. 1956).
B. The Drilling Unit (Well Spacing Regulations)
The Oil and Gas Production Act, hereinafter referred to as the Conservation Act, requires
the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission (AOGC) to establish “drilling units.” Ark. Code
Ann. § 15-72-302(b)(1) (Michie 1987)
1. Drilling units are established for separate common sources of supply to prevent
waste associated with excess drilling of wells. Id.
2. Drilling units must be configured to comprise the “maximum area which may be
efficiently and economically drained by one (1) well. Id. at § 302(b)(2).
3. Net drainage must be avoided so that each producer will have the opportunity to
produce his just and equitable share of the common source of supply. Id. at §
302(d).
a. Net drainage is drainage that is not equalized by counter drainage. Id.
(Net drainage is typically referred to as net uncompensated drainage).
b. the quantity of recoverable oil or gas in the developed area of the (his)
7
For the traditional criticism of the rule, see 5 Howard R. Williams, Patrick H. Martin &
Bruce M Kramer, Oil and Gas Law § 824.3 (1996). For a more modem criticism of the rule, see
Judge Posner's caustic and perceptive, yet gratuitous criticism of Geary in Finley v. Marathon Oil
Co., 34 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of major cases that follow the fraudulent
drainage rule, see Seacat v. Mesa Petroleum, 561 F. supp. 98 (D. Kan. 1983).
8Williams, Martin & Kramer, supra N. 7 at § 824.4.
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tract in the common source of supply bears to the recoverable oil and gas
in the total developed area of the common source of supply, insofar as the
amounts can be practically ascertained. Id. (Just and equitable share is
typically referred to as “fair share.”)
4. The Act requires the unit well to be “drilled approximately in the center”of the unit
to permit the tract to recover its “fair share”of the oil and gas. “Exception
well locations” are permitted so that the producer may avoid dry holes and seek
geological advantage in the well location. If necessary, reductions in well
allowable may be required to prevent the exception location well from draining
other units. Id . At. § 302(c).
C. The Effect of Drilling Units (Well Spacing Regulations).
1. Enactment of an Oil and Gas Conservation Act that permits the agency to conduct
evidentiary hearings, establish well spacing units, force integrate non-consenting
interests, issue drilling permits, and formulate rules and orders to prevent waste do
not preclude the oil and gas lessor from seeking damages in a civil suit for breach
of lessee’s implied obligation to prevent drainage, U V Industries, Inc. v.
Danielson, 602 P 2d 571 (Mont. 1979). In effect, a lessor harmed by drainage is
not relegated to an administrative remedy by the Conservation Act. See also Elliff
v Texon Drilling Co. 210 S.W,2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
2. The implied obligation to drill an offset protection well to prevent drainage does
not exist if the spacing regulations precluded the drilling of the well. Monsanto
Chemical Co. v. Sykes, 147 So.2d 290 (Miss. 1990). See also cases discussed
infra 4(C)(2).
3. A lessee, or mineral owner, is entitled to an additional well from the conservation
agency to prevent net uncompensated drainage. French v. Champlin Exploration,
Inc., 534 P.2d 1302 (Okla. 1975). The denial of such an additional well would
constitute “confiscation,” a noncompensable taking of property in violation of
state and federal constitutional due process clauses.
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III The Overlooked Fault and Drainage
A. The Overlooked Fault9
Stephens' failure to find the fault that separated the Dunn reservoir in the Gregory Unit
was judged by the prudent operator standard under the guise of the lessee’s implied obligation to
“prudently manage” the lease. An evaluation of the relevant evidence as to whether the fault
separation should have been discovered by the objective reasonable prudent operator lead both
the Chancellor and the Court to conclude that Stephens was not imprudent in failing to find the
fault. The fact that both Sunbelt’s and Stephens’ geologists, at one time or another, both missed
the fault when mapping the geology of the Gregory Unit, and the existence of the similarity in the
shut-in pressures of all of the local wells, falsely signifying that they were all producing from the
same reservoir, compelled the Court to conclude that an objective prudent operator would not
have been remiss in failing to detect the fault separation.
A clear inference from Sunbelt is that the prudent management standard that was applied
to determine if Stephens was liable for overlooking the fault is a negligence standard. The
prudent management of the lease standard masks the elements of duty, breach of duty, causation,
and foreseeability of the “reasonable man”standard of negligence.
That is not the only, nor the more liberal, standard that has been applied to the lessee’s
activities relating to lease management. In Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bishop. 441 P.2d 436 (Okla.
1967), the lessee was attempting to complete a well in an oil and gas pool with an associated gas
cap. Both the well and the lease were higher on the gas cap than the other wells in the field. In
completing the well, the lessee, relying on his expert, perforated the bottom two feet of the zone,
tested it for 7 hours, and then moved up the hole and perforated another section of the zone
where, after sandfracing, the well was ultimately completed. The well failed as an oil producer.
The lessors, sued to cancel the lease for the lessee' s failure to complete, test and operate the well
as a prudent operator. Lessors’ expert testified that the lessee should have completed the well in
the lowest possible portion of the Skinner zone to enhance the ratio of oil to gas production from
9
The opinion is murky as to the relevance of the “overlooked fault.” Pursuant to the
AOGC’s field rules, the fault separation of the Dunn formation would mean that the Gregory Unit
had two separate Dunn reservoirs, each being distinct common sources of supply, entitling the
Unit for a Dunn well for each reservoir. The failure to drill only one Dunn well because of the
overlooked fault would raise the issue of failing to comply with the implied development
covenant. Conversely, any additional well drilled on the Unit to the South of the fault would have
been an offset protection well that would have protected the Unit from drainage. Also, absent the
discovery of the fault separation, would the drainage claim ever have materialized? Therefore, the
missed fault may also be relevant to the drainage claim. To facilitate the discussion, the drainage
issue and the issue of the overlooked fault will be treated separately even though they may be
related.

-

6

-

the well. The lessor argued that the lessee did not properly test the lower perforations, the test
time being insufficient, and that the lower perforations should have been sandfraced. The lessee's
expert, who managed the well completion job, testified that the perforation of the well at the
higher elevation was an attempt to complete the well at the proper location based on the data
derived from the well logs and core analysis. The Court was unsympathetic to the lessor's claim.
The Court noted that the lessors' testimony “at most showed there might have been a better
method of completion.” The lessee, however, attempted to complete the well according to the
judgment of its expert. The Court held that the lessee could rely on it own experts which
foreclosed the lessor's claim as to the improper completion of well. The lessee's negligence in
completing the well did not appear to be an issue in the case.
May the difference between Sunbelt and Bishop over the standard to be applied to
determine if the lessee has complied with the obligation to prudently manage the lease be
explained on the basis that Sunbelt involved a geologist engaged in geological interpretation while
Bishop involved a petroleum engineer engaged in completing a well? Clearly, one can speculate
as to the differences, if any, between petroleum engineering and geology that may result in an
operator's misplaced reliance on a petroleum engineer being a defense to an imprudent lease
management claim while his misplaced reliance on the geologist subjects him to negligence
scrutiny.
B. Sunbelt's Drainage Claim
1. Dismissing the Fraudulent Drainage Syndrome
The Court affirmed the Chancellor’s refusal to shift the burden of going forward with the
evidence and the burden of persuasion from the plaintiffs to the defendants on the prudent
operator issue because of Stephens’ role as a common lessee whose adjacent unit wells were
allegedly draining the Gregory Unit.
2. Liability only for Net Uncompensated Drainage
Plaintiffs’ drainage action failed for lack of any losses incurred due to drainage. The
evidence indicated that the Gregory Unit, after the completion of the No. 2 ,3 and 4 unit wells in
the South fault block, will produce 30% to 40% more gas than was originally in place under that
portion of the Unit. In effect, as opposed to suffering net uncompensated drainage, plaintiffs
appear to be the beneficiaries of drainage coming from the off setting units.
3. The Compensable Drainage Issue
Defendants expert witness admitted that if the Gregory No. 2 well, which confirmed the
fault separation, had been drilled earlier, then the Gregory Unit would have produced even more
gas from the south fault block. This raises the issue, that was not decided in Sunbelt, of the
applicability of the theory of “compensable drainage.” Compensable drainage is the right of the
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lessor to be free from drainage from his unit even if such drainage is counterbalanced by drainage
to his unit. The theory, was popularized by the venerable and gifted scholars of oil and gas law,
Howard Williams, Charlie Myers10 and Eugene Kuntz,11who opined that a landowner, under the
rule of capture, has a right to recover all of the oil and gas underlying his tract. The migration of
his minerals to neighboring tracts is injurious to the landowner regardless of the extent of the
migration of oil and gas to his leasehold. A prudent operator would protect against such drainage
even if he were suffering no net loss. The theory of “compensable” drainage has historically
endured only as theory. No case has sustained the proposition. In a recent case to be discussed in
detail later, Fransen v. Conoco. Inc., 64 F.3d 1481 (10th Cir. 1995) cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1060
(1996), the plaintiff mineral owners, argued, inter alia, that the implied obligation to protect
against drainage encompasses liability for “compensated drainage” if the prudent operator “paying
quantities” standard is met. The 10th Circuit in Fransen rejected the “compensated drainage”
theory, holding that the establishment of spacing and drilling units for a common source of supply
by the conservation agency limits the lessee or operator to no more than its “fair share” of the oil
and gas. As the Court in Fransen observed, “none may take an unproportioned amount.”
IV. Implications of Sunbelt
What if Stephens had discovered the fault and not drilled the offset wells to protect against
drainage?
A. The implied obligation to seek an additional well in a drilling unit to protect against
drainage
1. The origin of the obligation: Merrill the Prophet
“The past three decades have witnessed an ever-increasing subjection of the petroleum
industry to regulation by administrative agencies Particulary has this been true with respect to
the adjustment of the interests of producers from a common source of supply and to the
preservation of the industry against what is regarded as wasteful and uneconomic production.
The methods adopted included proration, suspension of production, limitations on drilling, wellspacing, compulsory pooling, preferred use regulation, and the prohibition of wasteful practices.
Generally, these restrictions have been upheld as constitutional exercises of regulatory power.
The lessor surely may not be heard to assert that his lessee ought to violate such a regulation in
order to fulfill the obligation wh ich the law would have implied in the absence of the exercise of
the government's power.
It does not follow, however, that a lessee, confronted with an assertion that he has failed
to perform duties imposed upon him by the law of implied covenants, may set up an impregnable
10 5 Williams, Martin & Kramer, supra N. 7 at §§ 822.3-4.
11 5 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 61.3 (1991).
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defense merely by pointing to an administrative regulation which, on its face, forbids compliance
with the obligation put forward. The legal problems involved are far too complex to be resolved
so easily.” Maurice H. Merrill, Current Problems in the Law o f Implied Covenants in Oil and
Gas Leases, 23 Tex. L. Rev. 137, 141 (1945).
2. The Leading Cases
a. Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981), reh ’g
denied.
Plaintiffs, lessors, sued Amoco Production Co. (Amoco) for damages caused by fieldwide
drainage. The field, the Hastings West field, is a water drive oil reservoir that “dips” downward
from the southeast to the northwest. Amoco has 80% of the field production. Plaintiffs' leases
with Amoco are “downdip,”on the lower part of the reservoir. Amoco also operates leases that
are “updip,” on the higher part of the reservoir. Due to the natural reservoir conditions,
production from the updip leases causes the oil water contact line to rise, “watering out” the
downdip leases, and, also, drives the oil from the downdip leases to the updip leases, resulting in
fieldwide drainage. Production anywhere in the field, however, causes the oil-water contact to
rise and move from the downdip leases to the updip leases. Plaintiffs' downdip leases yield a
1/6th royalty while Amoco' s updip leases bear a l/8th royalty. Plaintiffs alleged that Amoco
slowed its production on the downdip leases and accelerated its production on the updip leases so
that it would ultimately recover the oil underlying the plaintiffs' leases from the updip leases at the
lower royalty. Plaintiff's also alleged that Amoco had a duly to obtain additional oil production
from their leases by drilling additional wells. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the trial
court's judgment for the plaintiffs. The Court held that the implied covenant to protect against
drainage encompasses fieldwide drainage. In so doing, the Court rejected Amoco' s argument that
it owed obligations to all o f its lessors in the field and that increasing production from the
downdip leases, depriving the updip leases of their natural advantage due to location on the
reservoir, would expose Amoco to liability to their updip leases. The Court responded by
emphasizing that Amoco had no economic incentive, due to the fieldwide drainage and the greater
royalty burden on the downdip leases, to increase production on the plaintiffs' leases. The
conflict between Amoco and its downdip and updip leases is a consequence of its being a
“common lessee.” If plaintiffs were Amoco's only lessors, Amoco's interest would be to capture
the most possible oil from the plaintiffs leases. In sum, the reasonable prudent operator standard
that Amoco owes to the plaintiffs is not to be reduced because Amoco has other lessors in the
field. The Court also held that Amoco had the duty, inhering in the reasonable prudent operator
standard, to seek additional wells (Rule 37 exceptions) from the Texas Railroad Commission
(TRC) to protect against fieldwide drainage.
Alexander indicated that the duties of a reasonably prudent operator to protect from field
wide drainage may include 1) drilling replacement wells 2) re-working existing wells 3) drilling
additional wells, seeking fieldwide regulatory action, seek rule 37 exceptions from the TRC,
seeking voluntary unitization and seeking other favorable relief. There is no duty unless such an
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amount of oil can be recovered to equal the cost of administrative expenses, drilling or reworking
and equipping a protection well, producing and marketing oil, and yield to the lessee a reasonable
expectation of profit.
Amoco should have applied for additional well to protect against drainage and having
failed to do so, plaintiffs were entitled to show the exceptions would most likely would have been
granted12 and they suffered damages because of the failure.
b. Spaeth v. Union Oil Co., 710 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1983)
Plaintiff lessor leased lands situated in an established 640 acre well spacing unit,
encompassing section 4, to Union Oil Co. (Union) who thereafter drilled a producing well on the
unit. Union also owns working interests in 3 off setting 640 acre spacing units that also produce
from the same common source of supply. Plaintiff and the other mineral interest owners in
section 4 filed an application with the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC or Commission)
for authorization to drill another well in the spacing unit. Union appeared before the Commission
and resisted the application. The Commission denied the application and plaintiff appealed to the
Oklahoma Supreme court. Union opposed the plaintiff s appeal before the Supreme Court.
Pending the appeal, plaintiff sued Union in federal court seeking damages and partial lease
cancellation for drainage. While the action in federal court was pending, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court reversed the Commission’s denial of plaintiff s request for an additional well to protect
against drainage. Spaeth v. Corporation Commission. 597 P.2d 320 (Ok. 1979 ). Union’s
petition for rehearing was denied by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
Plaintiff then recovered judgment in the federal court drainage case in the amount of
$22,807 actual damages and $3 million punitive damages. The 10th Circuit affirmed the judgment
as to liability. Union breached its obligation, under the implied obligation to protect against
drainage, to seek an additional well in the spacing unit. Union’s purported defense to opposing
the plaintiff's application before the Commission and appeal to the Supreme Court was that it had
relied on the advice of its experts. The argument was found to be without merit because plaintiff
had presented before the Commission proceeding the evidence of an expert supported by12
12
Merrill articulated the cause of action for breach of the obligation to seek administrative
relief as follows:
As part of his case, he must produce testimony of the lessee’s
inaction, the physical conditions of the field, the existence of
draining from beneath his tract to the existing well, the probable
productivity of a well upon his tract, and the facts which justify
granting an exception to the confiscation rule. (additional unit well).
Maurice H. Merrill, Fulfilling Implied Covenant Obligations
Administratively, 9 Okla. L. Rev. 125, 128 (1956).
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technical data while Union had offered no expert testimony. The punitive damage award was
sustained on the theory of “tortious drainage” based on Union’s reckless and wanton disregard of
the plaintiff's rights. However, finding that the award of punitive damages shocked the court' s
conscience, the case was remanded to federal district court with instructions to reduce the amount
of punitive damages.
with?

B

If You Go to the Agency to Get the Additional Well and Lose, is it Over and Done
1. Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, supra, contains the following dicta:

If the TRC denies the Rule 37 permits, after a reasonably prudent application, the
operator has no liability for not drilling the wells.
2 Merrill ’s Tenacious view
The lessee’s obligation is to exhaust administrative remedies, seek judicial review, perhaps
to appellate courts or the even to the highest tribunal, in order that the lessee may be adjudged
free to carry out his duties as an operator ordinarily prudent. A lessee who has failed to exhaust
his remedies to secure freedom so to act must be adjudged to have fallen short of his obligation to
his lessor, unless he can show by clear and convincing evidence that the effort would have been
fruitless. Maurice H. Merrill, Current Problems in the Law o f Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas
Leases, 23 Tex. L. Rev. 137, 145-146 (1945).
3. Amoco Production Co. v. Ware, 602 S.W.2d 620 (Ark. 1980). Reh’g denied.
Amoco Production Co. v. Ware, supra, indicates, if not holds, that the lessee has no per
se obligation to seek judicial review of an AOGC decision on behalf of a royalty owner. In Ware,
the plaintiff was a royalty own er whose 80 acre tract was situated on the edge of the Chalybeat
Springs oil and gas field. Plaintiff's tract was under lease to Amoco who was the majority
working interest owner in the field and was in the process of forming a fieldwide gas reinjection
unitization project. Before Amoco finalized its unitization project, Murphy Oil Co (Murphy)
petitioned the AOGC for a drilling permit for a 160 acre unit that included plaintiff s tract.
Amoco opposed Murphy's drilling permit on the basis that there was no oil and gas underlying
Murphy’s part of the proposed drilling unit. Plaintiff showed up at the hearing and testified for
Amoco. In part, plaintiff testified that he did not want a well drilled on the 160 acre unit because
it might be a dry hole and exclude his tract from participation in the unitization project. The
AOGC granted the drilling permit for the 160 acre unit. Amoco filed a notice of appeal from the
Commission's decision However, instead of pursuing the appeal, Amoco entered into a
unitization agreement with Murphy that included the 160 acre tract unit into the fieldwide unit.
Amoco included the 160 acre tract in the unit because Murphy, having been granted the contested
drilling permit, had been effectively found by the Commission to be entitled to share in the oil and
gas produced throughout the 160 acre tract. As a consequence of the inclusion of the 160 acre
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unit in the project, plaintiff's participation interest in the fieldwide unitization project was diluted.
Plaintiff sued Amoco in circuit court for damages for, inter alia, failing to appeal the
A O G C's Order. The Chancellor found for the plaintiff on the basis that Amoco breached the
implied covenant to "protect the interest” of the lessor which included the duty to appeal the
AOGC' s decision to a court of last resort. The Supreme Court reversed, finding no implied
obligation on behalf of Amoco to appeal the AOGC's decision. In so doing, the Court noted that
there was no evidence that the Commission’s decision would be readily reversed by a reviewing
court. Amoco, the Court opined, simply used its best judgment and proceeded to include the
entire 160 acre tract in accordance with the Commission’s decision on the drilling unit. The Court
further noted that the plaintiff could himself have appealed the decision of the AOGC.
C. Binding the royalty owners to the Agency’s determination that N o Additional
Well is required to protect Correlative Rights.
1. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel) and Collateral Attack
a. Collateral Attack
The order or determination o f an administrative body,13 acting within its
jurisdiction and under authority o f law is not subject to collateral attack. This is so in
absence o f fraud or bad faith. In this connection, it has been considered that the only
method o f attack available is by appeal as provided by statute. Bryant v. Public Service
Commission, 924 .W. 472, 482 (Ark. App. 1996).
b. Issue Preclusion
W hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves
disputed issues o f fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate
opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce
repose. Rainbolt v. Everett. 639 S.W .2d 532, 534 (Ark. App. 1982), citing United States
v. Utah Construction and Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), the leading United States
Supreme Court case applying the doctrine o f issue preclusion to an administrative agency

13
Katter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 765 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1985) held that a facially
valid forced integration order of the AOGC could not be collaterally attacked in an action for
money damages that was premised on the invalidity of the order due to a deficiency in the notice
of the integration hearing.
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adjudication. 14
2. A Trilogy o f Oklahoma Cases
a. Ruyle v. Continental Oil C o., 44 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S.Ct. 272 (1995), r e h ’g denied, 116 S.Ct. 557 (1995).
An O rder o f the Oklahoma Corporation Com mission (OCC) denying an
application to drill an additional well in a w ell spacing unit to prevent net uncom pensated
drainage w as held to collaterally estop the lessors, from recovering damages against the
lessee in a drainage action in federal court. In Ruyle, Plaintiffs15 own m ineral interests in
section 14 that are leased to Conoco. The OCC originally established section 14, and the
14Richardson v . Phillips Petroleum Co, 791 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1985), reh 'g denied,
799 F.2d 426 (8th. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 929 (1987), involved the
applicability o f the doctrine o f issue preclusion to a factual finding o f the AOGC in a
civil tort trespass action for damages occasioned to a w ell’s productivity by an adjacent
secondary recovery unitization project. In that case, the AOGC authorized the creation o f
a secondary recovery unitization project. The defendant was the project’s operator.
Plaintiffs, ow ners o f leases situated adjacent to the project, petitioned the AOGC to
revoke the unitization project due to the diminished productivity o f their wells caused by
the subsurface invasion o f the injected substances from the unitized operations. The
com m ission determ ined that plaintiffs’ lease operations were not “irreparably harm ed” for
purposes o f granting injunctive relief. Plaintiffs then f i le d a civil tort action in trespass in
state court, w herein the action was removed to federal court, seeking compensatory
damages. The 8th Circuit reversed the trial court’s summary judgm ent in favor o f the
defendant on the basis o f the issue preclusion. The court found that more than a de
minimus difference existed between the facts necessary to enjoin a secondary recovery
operation and those appropriate to award compensatory damages for trespass. Also, the
scope o f the Com m ission’s jurisdiction indicated that its proceedings are determinative
only for purposes o f the controversy before the agency. Since the Commission lacked the
jurisdiction to award m oney damages, the lack o f identity between the issues litigated and
decided in the comm ission hearings and the issues raised in the civil tort action preclude
application o f the collateral estoppel doctrine.
15 Some of the plaintiffs in Ruyle owned mineral interests that were not leased to Conoco.
The unleased mineral owners claim that Conoco as the unit operator owed a fiduciary duty that it
violated by failing to protect the unit against net uncompensated drainage.
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adjacent sections, as 640 acre well spacing units for the underlying Des M oines
formation. The well spacing order permitted only one well for each unit. Conoco owns
37% o f the unit production and operates the unit well, the M eacham # 1-14, on section 14.
Conoco also owns 29% of the well located on the adjacent spacing unit, the Downing #115, that is located on section 15. In October o f 1990, Great Bear Exploration, Inc.,
(GBE), who owned an interest in section 14, filed an application before the OCC seeking
an additional well in the unit to protect the Des Moines formation from net
uncompensated drainage by offset wells on adjacent units. Plaintiffs appeared before the
Commission proceedings and supported the application o f GBE. Conoco contested
G B E’s application. The ALJ denied the application for an additional well on the basis
that the existing unit well in section 14 would drain all the hydrocarbons underlying the
unit and that permitting an additional well in the unit would harm the correlative rights o f
the adjacent sections owners. Through all stages o f review, including the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, the A L J 's Order was affirmed.
W hile the application for the additional well was pending before the OCC,
plaintiffs sued Conoco in state court for, inter alia, damages for net uncompensated
drainage. Conoco moved the action to federal court and subsequently moved for
summary judgm ent due to the preclusive effect o f the Com m ission's Order. The federal
district court rejected Conoco’s collateral estoppel argument and the ju ry returned a
verdict for $55,000 actual damages and $1.14 m illion punitive damages. Conoco was
further ordered to drill an additional well or release it leases w ithin 120 days. The 10th
Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision on appeal, holding, inter alia, that the doctrine
o f issue preclusion as well as the Oklahoma statute prohibiting the collateral attack o f an
OCC Order bailed the plaintiffs common law drainage claim .16
In reaching this result, the federal appellate court observed that under Oklahoma
law ,17 applying the doctrine o f issue preclusion, once a tribunal has decided an issue o f
fact or law necessary to its judgment, that issue may not be relitigated between the same
parties or their privies in a suit on a different cause o f action.18 Issue preclusion only
applies when the issue sought to be barred has been “fairly and fully” litigated in th e prior
proceeding.
16 See Leek v. Continental Oil Co., 971 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1992).
17 The Court observed that it “must give the same preclusive effect to state court
judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the state in which judgments were
rendered.” 444 F.3d at 842.
18 Wilson v. Kane. 852 P.2d 717, 722 n.3 (Okla. 1993) which cites the Restatement 2nd of
Judgments § 27 (1982).
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The Court then examined the status o f the plaintiffs as parties to the Com m ission’s
proceedings and their privity w ith GBE, either o f which is required to invoke issue
preclusion. Plaintiffs initially executed agreements authorizing GBE to act on their
behalf in the OCC proceeding. Plaintiffs then filed m otions w ith the Adm inistrative Law
Judge (ALJ) seeking to intervene in the m atter and appear at the hearing to present
argum ents or evidence. Apparently the ALJ never acted on the motions. The A L J's initial
report, however, indicated that plaintiffs appeared at the hearings through their attorney
in support o f G B E ’s application. The federal district judge held that plaintiffs w ere not
subject to issue preclusion because Conoco failed to establish that plaintiffs w ere parties
to the proceeding. Likewise, finding that plaintiffs did not sufficiently control G B E ’s
course o f conduct in the proceedings, the trial judge concluded that no privity existed.
Further, the trial court held that the Com m ission’s proceedings did not afford the
plaintiffs an effective opportunity to litigate the issues. The 10th circuit, looking at the
totality o f the circumstances, reversed the trial court and held that plaintiffs were
“parties” to the O C C ’s proceedings for purposes o f issue preclusion. The court reasoned
that the failure o f the ALJ to formally rule on the plaintiffs m otion to intervene did not
prevent the plaintiffs from participating in the hearing. The Oklahoma Conservation Act,
52 Okla. Stat. Ann.§ 87.2(a), designated mineral owners as “proper parties” to the
proceedings for an additional well. The Plaintiffs entered an appearance at the hearing
through their attorney which in accordance with the Com m ission’s Rules o f Practice
designates them as a “party" o f record.” In addition to finding that the plaintiffs were
parties to the proceeding for purposes o f the doctrine o f issue preclusion, the Court also
concluded that plaintiffs had been presented with the requisite opportunity to fully and
fairly litigate the issues before the Commission.
Plaintiffs also argued on appeal that issue preclusion should not be applied
because the issues before the court, involving damages for drainage,19 only appertained to
private rights, and were different than the issues resolved in the Com mission proceedings,
involving protection o f correlative rights, that appertained only to m atters o f public
interest. The 10th Circuit rejected the plaintiffs argument. Even though the C om m ission’s
jurisdiction to “protect correlative rights” is limited to instances affecting the “public
interest,” and only courts can award damages for breach o f contract, there is a direct
relationship betw een correlative rights and drainage. The Com mission determined

19
The binding of courts by factual determinations made by Oil and Gas Conservation
Agencies on the basis of issue preclusion has been changed by the United States Supreme Court
case of United States v. U tah Construction and Mining C o., 384 U.S. 394 (1966). The
change is not yet widely understood. For example, C onoco’s law yer before the federal
district court in Ruy le “voiced his belief (to the trial judge) that the court was not bound on the
issue of drainage because the Commission cannot assess money damages.” 44 F.3d at 841.
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through its administrative process, pursuant to its jurisdiction to protect correlative rights,
that net uncompensated drainage was not occurring to section 14.20 W hen the judicial
relief depends entirely upon the adjustment and protection o f correlative rights that has
already been ruled on by the Commission, the court is not at liberty to award such relief
if the Commission has concluded that correlative rights have not been violated.21
b. Fransen v. Conoco. Inc., 64 F.3d 1481 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S.Ct. 1060(1996).
Involved the same wells and spacing units and administrative proceeding involved
in Ruy le. In Fransen, the plaintiffs were lessors who, though given notice o f the GBE
application for the additional well, did not participate in the administrative proceedings.
Plaintiffs sued Conoco22 in federal district court alleging, inter alia, the failure to protect
the premises against drainage. The trial court granted summary judgm ent to Conoco on
the basis that they could not be liable for failing to drill an additional well when the OCC
had prohibited the drilling o f an additional well on the unit. The 10th Circuit affirmed
the trial court's holding on appeal.
Because the plaintiffs did not participate in the O C C ’s proceedings, the Court
refused to bar the plaintiffs action on the basis o f issue preclusion. The statutory
prohibition on collateral attacks against the O C C ’s orders barred all o f the m ineral
owners' claims. One need not be a party to the proceeding to be barred from collaterally
attacking a conservation agency order. Because the plaintiffs m ust prove that a
reasonable prudent operator would drill an additional well on section 14 to protect against
drainage, their drainage claims c o n s t i t ute an impermissible collateral attack that w ould

20 The Commission held, based on the ALJ’s finding, that Conoco “acted prudently” in
section 14 by recovering the unit’s fair share of gas and resisting GBE’s application to drill an
additional well to recover more than the unit’s fair share. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the
Commission’s determination as to Conoco’s “prudence” was not entitled to preclusive effect
because it was unnecessary to determine the issues before the Commission. The Court rejected
that argument on the basis that such a finding by the OCC was a necessary and inevitable element
to its determination that no improper drainage was occurring.
21 Finally, the Court further held that OCC order was subject to issue preclusion and the
statutory prohibition against collateral attack even though the Order was not a final, appealable
Order at the time of trial.
22
In addition to Conoco, C.I.G. Exploration, Inc. (CIGE) held leases in section 14 from
some of the plaintiffs and was a defendant in this action.
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avoid, defeat, evade or deny the effect o f the OCC order that denied an additional well to
section 14. The Court also noted that a prudent operator would not drill a well that is
prohibited by law.
In rejecting plaintiffs’ civil tort drainage claim solely on the basis o f collateral
attack, the 10th Circuit avoided having to consider additional arguments, not raised in
Ruy le, concerning the inappropriateness o f barring the mineral ow ners’ claim by issue
preclusion. Plaintiffs argued that issue preclusion should not apply because the notice o f
the OCC proceedings was deficient in that it did not indicate that drainage was an issue
before the Commission, and, the mineral owners could not have foreseen that the
C om m ission’s factual findings could have preclusive effect. Likewise, plaintiffs argued
that the differences between the administrative proceedings and the judicial proceedings,
over the right to a jury trial, the availability o f m oney damages, and the more extensive
trial proceedings, that distinguish the judicial action, but are missing from the
administrative proceeding, makes unfair the application o f the doctrine o f collateral
estoppel to the drainage action.
The m ineral owners also argued that even if the OCC order prevented the drilling
o f an additional protection well on section 14, the defendants had the implied obligation
to seek other administrative rem edies to protect the lessors interest from net
uncom pensated drainage. The defendants could have requested the OCC to adjust the
well allowables, either reducing section 15's well allowable or increasing section 14's
well allowable, or require paym ent o f compensatory royalty by the offset well operators.
However, because the OCC had determined in the GBE proceeding that section 14 was
not suffering net uncom pensated drainage but recovering its fair share o f the common
source o f supply, the defendants could not have obtained the suggested administrative
relief without collaterally attacking the order the OCC order. Therefore, the court
concluded that Conoco cannot be liable for seeking such relief.
c.

Sprowls v. Oryx Energy C o., 72 F.3d 138 (10th Cir. 1995).

Sprowls is factually identical to Ruyle and Fransen in that a previous order o f the
OCC that determined that the spacing unit was not suffering substantial net
uncom pensated drainage barred, on the basis o f an impermissible collateral attack and
issue preclusion, the m ineral ow ners' subsequent judicial action for drainage against the
unit operator.23 The 10th Circuit in Sprowls emphasized that the Commission order

23The Com mission proceeding involved a “despacing proceeding,” a hearing to
despace the previously established 640 acre spacing unit and “respace,” recreate four (4)
160 acre spacing units. The despacing order, if granted by the Commission, would have
-
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prevented the drilling o f an additional well in the unit and that no breach o f a duty,
express or implied, can be based on the operator's failure to drill a well that it cannot
lawfully drill.

permitted additional wells to be drilled within the confines o f the “despaced” unit. The
Commission order determined that despacing was not necessary to protect correlative
rights since the existing unit well would drain 182% of the amount o f gas that underlays
the unit. The Court noted that this finding necessarily includes a determination that the
640 acre unit is not suffering substantial uncompensated drainage.
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